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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION
Case No. 970489-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
:

Priority No. 2

WILLIAM PATTON
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Defendant was afforded sufficient discovery?

2.

Whether testimony of alleged ^surprise witness' had a

prejudicial impact on Appellant?

1

Both issues presented in this case represent mixed questions
of law and fact.
review.

As such, there are two applicable standards of

The first is applied to factual findings and the other

to conclusions of law.

As to factual determinations, the

standard of review is one of clear error.

State v. Case/ 884

P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).

Conclusions of law, on the other hand

are reviewed for correctness.

See

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774

(Utah 1991) .
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3).
No trash, used materials, junk, household
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The
accumulation of more than one (1) such item constitutes
a junk yard as defined in chapter 14.06, Provo City
Code and must be removed from the property, stored
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in
an M-2 zone.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Joan Patton and co-defendant, William Patton were
served with summons on May 31, 1996, charging that on March 19,
1996, both defendants were in violation of Provo City Code
§14.34.080, a Class B misdemeanor.

On May 19, 1997, a bench

trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott resulted in the
conviction of both defendants.
23, 1997.

Defendants were sentenced on June

Joan Patton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth

District Court the same day, commencing this action.
2

On July 23,

1997, William Patton also filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Fourth District Court.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In November of 1995, Anthony Malloy came to work for Provo
City as a zoning enforcement officer (Tr. at 7 ) . Officer Malloy
is assigned to a specific geographic area of Provo City (Tr. at
8).

When officer Malloy was assigned to his area, he was given

all the open files within that area (Tr. 8 ) . Aside from clearing
up the violations in the continuing files, officer Malloy is
charged with addressing citizen complaints regarding zoning
violations in his area (Tr. at 8 ) .
One of the open files given to officer Malloy concerned
Defendants' property (Tr. at 8 ) . Defendants' have a history of
zoning violations based on convictions for zoning violations in
both 1990 and 1993 by two different judges (Sentencing Transcript
at 8-9).

In 1995, Provo City filed an order to show cause based

on a continuing problem (Sentencing Transcript at 9-10).
However, the notice was not filed in a timely manner and the
Court's jurisdiction to extend Defendants' probation expired at
the end of that year (Id). At this point, officer Malloy was
given the file and instructed to verify whether a continuing
violation existed (Tr. at 8 ) .
On or about February 23, 1996, officer Malloy visited
defendants' property and confirmed the continuing existence of
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junk, trash, and other materials in the yard, in violation of
Provo City Code §14-34-080 (Tr. at 8-9). Because defendants have
a sign on their fence warning all local and federal agents to
stay off the property, no personal contact was made with
defendants (Tr. at 10).

Instead, a letter was sent to defendants

on February 23, 1996, requesting that they contact the zoning
office in order that compliance might be obtained (Tr. at 9-10).
On March 11, 1996, in response to the above letter, officer
Malloy received a correspondence from defendant Joan Patton (Tr.
at 13). While different issues were addressed in the letter,
there was never an expression of willingness to comply with the
zoning ordinance.

A second notice to comply was sent to

Defendants the same day (Tr. at 12). This time Defendants failed
to respond altogether (Id). On March 19, 1996, officer Malloy
returned to Defendants' residence to confirm the continued
existence of the violation (Id). During this visit, officer
Malloy was accompanied by another zoning officer, Roger Gonzalez.
Officer Gonzalez took several photographs of Defendants' yard for
the purpose of documenting the zoning violation (Id).
At trial, Defendants objected to the testimony of officer
Gonzalez.

According to testimony by Joan Patton, "I did not

receive any discovery that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a
witness, therefore I have not had a chance to prepare" (Tr. at
63) . All discovery in this case was conducted informally (Tr. at

4

65).

At trial, Gary McGinn, attorney for Provo City, stated:
Joan Patton has come into my office
several times. Our office has an open file
policy. I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe
also, has come in and asked for discovery.
In our office if — and to show them, in our
file — if they come in we'll allow them to
look at the file, or we just make copies of
everything that's in the file. We give
everybody everything, there should be no
secrets, that's our office policy and that's
what we do.
With that, I know as Joan Patton has
come in several times, we do have a cover
sheet. It has a list of our officers that
says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger Gonzalez from
the zoning department." Any time they come
in and take a look that's there...

(Tr. at 64) .
The Court denied the objection and allowed the testimony of
officer Gonzalez (Tr. at 66). At the end of the trial, Defendants
were convicted for violation of Provo City Code
§ 14.34.080(3). The Court described the basis of its decision in
the following language:
In reading the statute and hearing the
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy
and Mr. Gonzalez, which is the testimony we
have, and the testimony of Mr. Keller that we
had a rather dilapidated neighborhood in
which the defendants' property complied in
making it appear to be the same as the
neighborhood in question, I find that the
City has met its burden of proof concerning
the second portion of that charging
information in Count I, therefore I find the
defendants guilty as charged.
From the plain and simple meaning of the
ordinance, so you have your record on appeal,
folks, I believe that the evidence has
sufficiently demonstrated that there are
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items which consist of junk, stored trash,
scraps of wood, deteriorated cardboard boxes,
and even potential food products that looked
like they had gone bad, from the witnesses
testimony.
And with that testimony being the only
testimony on the record, with nothing else to
rebut it or to describe what it was, then the
Court has only one conclusion to draw, and
that is is it believable or is it not, and I
find that the City has met its proof with
respect to belief.
(Tr. at 115-116).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in convicting defendants for
illegal storage of junk in violation of Provo City Code
§ 14.34.080(3).

Defendants were afforded proper discovery in

accordance with Plaintiff's standard open-file policy.

Assuming

arguendo that Plaintiff did fail to provide sufficient discovery,
testimony from the alleged ^surprise witness' had no prejudicial
impact on Defendant.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF ILLEGAL
STORAGE OF JUNK

A.

Defendant was afforded proper discovery in accordance
with Plaintiff s open file policy
Requests for discovery are governed by the Utah Rules of

6

Criminal Procedure.

According to Rule 16(a), the prosecution

must, upon request, disclose to the defendant "material or
information of which he has knowledge" as to any "item of
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be
made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense" (Id.).
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), the
Supreme Court of Utah held that the prosecution must respond to
discovery requests in a manner which is not misleading.

In order

to achieve this end, the Court articulated two requirements that
the prosecution must meet in responding to requests for
discovery:
First, the prosecution either must produce all of
the material requested or must identify explicitly
those portions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material
requested, it must continue to disclose such material
on an ongoing basis to the defense.
Id.
In this case, the gravamen of Defendants' appeal is based on
a claim that Provo City failed to provide sufficient discovery.
Specifically, it is claimed that Plaintiff failed to provide
Defendants with a witness list.

The trial court rejected this

claim due to the fact that the record contained no request for
the identification of witnesses (Tr. at 65-66) .

Defendants

concede that "the entire discovery process has been handled very
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informally" (Sentencing Transcript at 3 ) .
This informality is an enormous benefit to defendants who
are not currently required to petition the court or make formal
written discovery requests to the City. Under the City's current
open-file policy, defendants have full access to all of the
information possessed by the prosecution (Tr. at 64). A more
formal discovery process would inoculate the City from charges
like those now brought by Defendants.

Nevertheless, defendants,

often appearing pro se, would hardly be served by the adoption of
an oppressively formal discovery policy.
In this case, both defendant Joan Patton and Michael
Humiston, attorney for defendant William Patton, took the
opportunity of visiting Plaintiff's office to review the file.
The file contains the charging information as well as a cover

sheet entitled Provo City
Sheet.

Attorney's

Office

Criminal

This sheet has a heading entitled Witnesses

Under that heading, the following is written:
(zoning)

and Roger

Gonzalez

(zoning).

Anthony

Information
(Officers).
Malloy

(Tr. at 64).

At trial, defendant William Patton's attorney asserted the
following: "[E]very document in this file was provided to me in
discovery except the one that Mr. McGinn is referring to.

This

is the first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez" (Tr. at 64-65).
Despite this claim, the cover sheet in question would have been
in the file.

In fact, it is stapled to the rest of the charging
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documents. It is likely that defendants' claim that they did not
see the cover sheet is simple oversight on the part of Defendants
and their counsel.
Even defendant Joan Patton does not allege deliberate
subterfuge on the part of the City:

"I personally did not feel

that this one [omission] was done deliberately or maliciously,
nor do I believe that the oversight was intention[sic] on the
part of the Provo City prosecutor" (Sentencing Transcript at 5 ) .
Assuming arguendo that the cover sheet was mysteriously absent on
those occasions in which defendants reviewed the file, there is
also mention of officer Gonzalez in another of the file's
documents.
In a memorandum dated March 20, 1996 (from officer Molloy to
Gary McGinn), officer Molloy states the following: "March 19,
1996, I went with Roger Gonzalez to the site and took the
attached photos."

Like the cover sheet, this memorandum was also

a part of Defendant's file.

This memorandum clearly indicates

that officer Molloy was accompanied by officer Gonzalez to the

specific
violation

property

in question

was charged.

on the day for which the

zoning

Based on the informal nature of the

discovery process, such a document alone should adequately place
a defendant on notice. Defendants do not allege that this
document was absent from the file to which they were given full
access.

9

Defendants have simply failed to show that Provo City was
derelict in its duty to provide reasonable discovery.

In short,

by giving Defendants unlimited access to the entire file,
Plaintiffs fulfilled their duty to provide all materials
requested.

Pursuant to Plaintiff's standard open-file policy,

Defendants were placed on notice that officer Gonzalez was a
listed witness. Defendants have failed to establish that they
were intentionally misled at any point during the discovery
process. They have also failed to establish that the City was
derelict in its duty to disclose potential witnesses. Defendants
had ample opportunity to become aware that Mr. Gonzalez was a
potential witness.

B.

Testimony of alleged
impact on Defendant

A

surprise witness' had noprejudicial

Even assuming that Provo City failed to provide adequate
discovery, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the
introduction of testimony by officer Gonzalez was prejudicial to
their case.

Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded."
Thus, the Court must engage in a two-prong analysis.

First,

it must determine whether the trial court erred in allowing
officer Gonzalez's testimony.

Only upon an affirmative response
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to the above question is further analysis necessary.

If the

Court finds the trial court was in error, it must then determine
whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant
reversal.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).

The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following:
We have ruled in several cases that the
Rule 30 phrase "affect the substantial rights
of a party" means that an error warrants
reversal "only if a review of the record
persuades the court that without the error

there was a reasonable
likelihood
of a more
favorable
result
for the
defendant."
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (citing State v.
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982)(emphasis added)).
A ^reasonable likelihood' is only achieved when "the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to
undermine our confidence in the verdict."

Horrel v. Utah Farm

Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).
Even without officer Gonzalez's testimony, it is clear that
defendants would have nevertheless been convicted in this case.
Defendants baldly asserts that "all other evidence other
than Mr. Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge"
(Defendant's Brief at 14). This statement is demonstrably false.
In convicting Defendants, the trial judge specifically relied
upon the testimony of all three witnesses, not just officer
Gonzalez (Tr. at 115-116).
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Next, Defendants assert the following: "The court found only
that there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and
this was a matter that only Mr, Gonzales had testified to"
(Defendant's Brief at 13). Again, this assertion is demonstrably
false.

To begin, the Court never found that firewood

on the property.

was present

Rather, the court determined that scraps

wood were found on the property.

of

(Tr. at 116) .

Further, Defendants' claim that Mr. Gonzalez was the only
person to testify concerning scrap wood in the yard is also
demonstrably false.

At various points during the trial, officer

Molloy also testified that scrap wood was present on the front
yard:

"In the front yard there were lumber -- specific items

that are listed in that section of the ordinance" (Tr. at 9 ) ;
"There were lumber and other debris.

He had things that I would

see as just being trash that I would remove from the lot, but I
do not recall the specifics" (Tr. at 24).
Despite the above statements specifically referring to
scrap wood, Defendants object to officer Molloy's inability to
recall greater specifics.

In fact, officer Molloy's recollection

of scrap lumber in the front yard alone is enough to sustain a
conviction for a violation of

§ 14.34.080(3).

In fact, scrap

material is clearly listed as a prohibited item.
In such cases such as this it is impractical to expect
zoning officer to produce itemized lists of trash and junk.
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a

Often, such accumulations defy itemization. Nonetheless, in the
instant case, officer Molloy's testimony was not limited to scrap
wood.

In fact, officer Molloy testified as to the existence of

"lumber" (Tr. at 9 ) , "debris" (Tr. at 24), "trash" (Tr. at 24),
"junk" (Tr. at 47), "scrap material" (Tr. at 50), and "equipment
or parts generally" (Tr. at 51). Most of the above items are
specifically mentioned in the ordinance.

As such, officer

Molloy's testimony, as believed by the court, was more than
sufficient in and of itself to warrant conviction.
It should be noted that officer Molloy's testimony was
corroborated by Defendants' only witness, Brent Keller.

While

being questioned by Defendants, Mr. Keller offered the following:
The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's
not a neighborhood I would like to live in.
There are numerous trailers with junk in
them, there are yards with piles of rock and
debris. One house in particular stands out
as I went through the neighborhood last
Friday and again today, there's a carport
full of cardboard boxes clear up to the
ceiling. I couldn't even — I imagine there
were many dozens of these cardboard boxes,
which is about four houses down from the
Patton residence.
A house not to far away, a log house,
the front yard is full of weeds. Many houses
in the area are very similar. It's an older
neighborhood, the houses aren't well kept,
the yards aren't well kept, they are not the
immaculate yards that I see in many of the
other parts of Provo. That's how I'd
describe the neighborhood.
Q.
Is there a substantial difference
between the defendant's property and the rest
of the neighborhood?
A.
Not that I noticed . . . .
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(Tr. at 93-94) .
Apparently this testimony was offered in an attempt to show
inconsistent enforcement of the zoning ordinances.

According to

Defense Counsel: "Our position is that it's an arbitrary
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being singled out
for no apparent reason . . ." (Tr. at 96). This claim was
summarily rejected by the Court (Tr. at 97-98).

In fact, officer

Molloy testified that Defendants' were not the only ones on the
street charged with zoning violations (Tr. at 55). Further,
officer Molloy testified that the instant charges were
precipitated by "several calls from concerned residents in
regards to your property" (Tr. at 56-57).
Obviously, Mr. Keller's testimony was relied upon heavily by
the trial court in deciding to convict (Tr. at 115). At
sentencing, the judge reiterated:
You folks called a Mr. Keller to testify
for you as your witness, and Mr. Keller
described the condition of the your property
at the time in question, who was your
witness, as being an eyesore. It was a
terrible neighborhood, he said, and yours —
and the condition of your property was
consistent with the way things look in
general, it was bad. I mean he painted a
picture for me that wasn't very pretty,
certainly not acceptable.
(Sentencing Transcript at 16-17) .
As pointed out in Defendant's brief, a number of factors
must be considered in determining whether a witness' testimony is
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sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal (Defendant's Brief
at 14). Among those included are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case;
Whether the testimony is cumulative;
The presence or absence of corroborating or
contradicting testimony;
The extent of cross examination; and
The overall strength of the case.

(Defendant's Brief at 14) (citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,
902 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987) .
In light of the facts present in this case, analysis of the
above factors weighs in favor of affirming Defendants'
conviction.

First, it has been clearly established that

sufficient evidence existed to warrant a conviction even without
the testimony of Mr. Gonzalez.
largely cumulative.

The testimony of Mr. Gonzalez was

The thrust of Mr. Gonzalez's testimony

merely confirmed the existence of the "debris of wood and lumber
scraps that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the
yard. . ." (Tr. at 68) .
The next factor to be considered is the presence or absence
of corroborating or contradicting testimony.

Defendants failed

to introduce a scintilla of testimony that contradicted either
the testimony of officer Molloy or officer Gonzalez.

On the

contrary, testimony from Defendants' only witness actually
corroborated testimony offered by the prosecution witnesses.
Another factor to be considered is the extent of cross
examination.

Although Mr. Gonzalez was subjected to cross
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examination by Defendant's counsel, it is claimed that "[c]ross
examination was limited by the element of surprise . . ."
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This claim is severely undermined by
the simple fact that Mr. Gonzalez only testified as to the
condition of Defendants' property on March 19, 1996. Defendants
and counsel would be expected to be adequately prepared to
discuss the condition of the property on the very day of the
charged offense. Mr. Gonzalez' testimony was very narrow in scope
and cross examination questions would have been limited to that
very narrow line of testimony. Mr. Gonzalez was m

fact, cross-

examined, and Defendant was not substantially disadvantaged by
any "surprise."
Finally, the overall strength of the case must be
considered.

The prosecution's case was supported by every single

witness presented to the trial court.

Defendants failed to offer

a single word of testimony in contradiction.

While the

prosecution offered specific testimony that the yard was out of
compliance on the day in question, Defendants were relegated to
claiming discriminatory enforcement (Tr. at 96) and contesting
the Constitutionality of the zoning ordinance.

(Tr. at 110).

In

accordance with this stratagem, most of the cross examination of
officer Molloy was focused on whether or not the Provo City Code
adequately defines common words such as "junk" and "scrap
material" (Tr. at 47-50).

16

C.

Because of Defendant's failure to substantially comply with
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court should decline to
address the remaining issues.
In addition to the matters treated above, defendant Joan

Patton introduced the following four issues for the Court's
consideration:
3.
Did the defendant have a right to rely on the
standards of enforcement set by a Court of Competent
Jurisdiction during prior cases.
4.
Did the Trial Court err in refusing to allow
evidence of a Court established standard.
5.
The ordinance should be struck down as vague as it
lacks standards necessary to prevent arbitrary
enforcement.
6.
The ordinance violates the defendant's
Constitutional rights in its application by failure to
provide Equal Protection and Uniform Application.
(Defendant's Brief at 2 ) .
Defendant's treatment of the above issues fails
to meet the minimum standards set by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

The pertinent portions of Rule 24 state the

following:
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:
#

• •

(5) A statement of the issues presented for
review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting
authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing
that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of
an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(9)

An argument.

The argument shall contain
17

the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue
not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on.
(Rule 24(a)(5)&(9),Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).
In 1996, this Court stated:
"[W]e concede that not every brief filed is in strict
compliance with our rules." However, to permit
meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with
the briefing requirements sufficiently to "enable us to

understand . . . what particular
errors were
allegedly
made, where in the record those errors can be found,
and why, under applicable
authorities,
those errors are
material ones necessitating
reversal or other
relief."
In this case, in which the appellant has failed to

provide adequate

legal

analysis

and legal

authority

in

support of his claims, appellants assertions do not
permit appellate review.
Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Ut. App.
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah
App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (emphasis
added).
With regard to the final four issues introduced in the
present case, the above language is particularly applicable.
Defendant has failed to cite to the record showing whether or
where such issues were preserved in the trial court.
nowhere in the defendant's

In fact,

discussion of the above four issues

do we find any reference or citation to the proceedings of the
trial court.

This inadequacy makes appellate review highly

impracticable due to a lack of particularity in the charges of
error.
Thus, defendant Joan Patton's issues 3, 4, 5, and 6 have not
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been adequately briefed. "This court has routinely declined to
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal."
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1992). The Utah Supreme
Court has held:

"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the

issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.''

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,

450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784
(111. Ct. App. 1981)).

At least with respect to the final four

issues, the defendant's brief is illustrative of the type of case
the court

mentioned above.

In fact, that portion of the brief (treating the four issues
in question) amounts to little more than conclusory statements
which do not provide this court with the analysis necessary to
review the lower court's ruling.

A review of some of the

defendant's claims is useful for purposes of determining
compliance with Rule 24.

First, defendant admits that she has

had previous zoning violations,1 and alleges that in convicting
her in the instant case, the trial court has somehow changed
previously set standards of compliance. (Defendant's Brief at 1516). However, defendant fails to provide any meaningful analysis

}"This appeal results from the fourth trial and conviction
of the defendant, Joan Patton for a violation relating to the
appearance and upkeep of her property" (Defendant's Brief at 15).
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or any

detail whatsoever concerning the alleged changes in

enforcement.
Second,the defendant opted to focus on the constitutionality
of the zoning ordinance in question.(Defendant's Brief at 16).
Defendant challenges the ordinance as vague and
arbitrary.(Defendant's Brief at 16). Again, defendant has failed
to include any citations to the record, nor has any discussion of
the specific language of the ordinance been advanced in support
of the allegation.

The only authority presented to the Court:

whatsoever is a case out of Washington state. The cited case is
not

discussed analytically, just mentioned as "supported in part

by . . . "(Defendant's Brief at 17).
The very same Washington case is used as the only

authority

to support the defendant's single paragraph alleging the
"unconstitutional overbreadth'7 of the Provo City zoning
ordinance.

(Defendant's Brief at 17-18).

Again, the Washington

case is the single authority cited for the proposition that the
Provo ordinance is "void for unreasonableness." (Defendant's
Brief at 18). Unfortunately, the defendant fails to provide
adequate discussion of even the Washington case.

All that the

defendant's brief reveals is the fact that the case concerned a
pedestrian interference statute and a specific intent
requirement. (Defendant's Brief at 17).
Defendant's final claim, an equal protection violation,

20

suffers from a similar lack of legal or factual analysis.
Essentially, the defendant claims that those "on a lower rung of
the economic ladder" are treated unfairly in the enforcement of
the zoning ordinance.

Having set forth this conclusory

allegation, the defendant again fails to introduce a scintilla of
evidence or support from the record to indicate that such
discrimination has occurred in the present case.
D.

Defendant failed to preserve issues 3,4, 5 and 6 at the
trial court level therefore those issues may not be
addressed on appeal.
Further, issues 3,4,5 and 6 of defendant's brief were not

properly preserved for appellate review. The general rule is that
an issue may not be presented to the appellate court that was not
first presented to the trial court. DeVore v. IHC Hospitals,
Inc., 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994);Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of
Education., 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990);Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d
938 (Utah 1987). This Court has held that matters neither raised
in pleadings, nor put in issue of trial court cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal. Bundv v. Century
Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).
With respect to issues 3 and 4: Defendant did not adequately
raise these issues at trial. No legal argument was presented
regarding defendant's claims of a breach in the trial court's
standards of enforcement. No pretrial motions were filed
addressing the issue.
21

With respect to issues 5 and 6: At the pretrial hearing held
on January 30, 1997 before the Honorable Fred D. Howard,
defendant made an oral motion to dismiss alleging that the
ordinance was vague and overbroad. (Transcript of Pretrial
Hearing at 12) Judge Howard gave the defendant time to brief any
challenges to the ordinance that she may have had and set a
hearing on any motions that defendant wanted to file. (Transcript
of Pretrial Hearing at 14-15). Defendant failed to file any
motions or brief the court on any constitutional challenges to
the ordinance. Defendant has failed to preserve these issues for
appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
testimony of officer Gonzalez. Defendants were given full access
to the entire file in accordance with Plaintiff's open-file
policy. Defendants should have thus been on notice that officer
Gonzalez was a witness.

Further, even if this court were to

find error in the trial court's decision to allow officer
Gonzalez to testify, his testimony was not sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal.

Finally, because of the

Defendant's failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Court should decline to address the remainder of
the issues introduced by the defendant.
Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff requests that

22

Defendants' conviction for illegal storage of junk in violation
of Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3) be affirmed.

-oh
Dated this

1I

day of April, 1998.

Christine M. Petersen
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM
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1

I basis in the zoning contacts?

2

A.

I'd work with the zoning ordinance, the

3

zoning map, other supporting documentation that Utah

4

County has; building permits, Utah County ownership

5

records.

6

Q.

And how long did you work there?

7

A.

Approximately six months.

8

Q.

And then from there you've went to -- got

9

employment with Provo City; is that correct?

10

A.

That is correct.

11

Q.

What type of materials in relation to zoning

12

do you use on a daily basis for Provo City?

13

A.

I use the zoning ordinance and the zoning

14

map.

15

that we've worked with, also with building permit

16

records and also the Utah County Recorder's Office

17

information.

18

Q.

IS

We have a case file history of previous cases

What was the approximate date of when you

came to work for Provo City?

20

A.

It was in November of 1995.

21

Q.

At that time when you came to work what

22
23

duties were assigned to you?
I

A.

In our office different areas are assigned

24

to a specific zoning officer so that we can take care

25

of specific areas and follow through with those cases.

I was assigned a specific area of Provo City.
Q.

After you were assigned this specific area

what did you do?
A.

I was given several cases, and also we

receive zoning complaints that are called in or people
come into the counter, and we receive from those -that information we proceed to investigate whether
there is any violation, and then I act on that kind of
information.
Q.

Were you given a file concerning the Patton

property?
A.

I was.

Q.

What were your instructions with that file?

A.

I was informed that I should proceed to go

out into the field and verify that there was still a
continuing violation.

I did that, and there was a

violation in my opinion at the site.
Q.

What violation are you talking about?

A.

Violation of Section 14-34-080, the

accumulation of junk, trash and other materials in the
yard.
Q.

And you say you went to the site?

A.

I did, I went out to the property.

Q.

And what did you do when you arrived there?

A.

I looked around the site to see if there

9

were materials that are specified in Section 14-34-030
in the yard area.

I did not go onto the site, I

viewed the site from the public right-of-way. or the
sidewalk.
Q.

At that point what types of materials did

you see?
A.

I saw numerous materials that I don't recaLl

specifics on.

In the front yard area there were

lumber -- specific items that are listed in that
section of the ordinance.

There was in addition a

trailer in the front yard area that appeared to be
inoperable, which is a violation of the city
ordinance.
I also saw the fence that was on the front
property line, and it was in excess of three feet in
height, which is restricted by the city zoning
ordinance.
Q.

Mr. Malloy, on what day approximately was

this that you went out to the property for the first
time?
A.

I have here a note that I did go to the site

and sent the first letter out February 23, 1996.
Q.

So it was sometime around--

A.

Around that date, either that day or the day

before the letter was sent to William and Joan Patton

20
I went to the site.
Now you indicated you sent 3 letter

whac

relationship to your visit?
The letter went out on February 23rd.
that Letter I informer

In

w u c i s ol Lhe property the

information I obtained from the Utah County Recorder's
Office that the office had been contacted regarding a
zoning vi:iaLuii, ! i.dd been t. c the site and verified
the violation was in existence, and requested that
they contact me in order that ve can gain compliance
f:ji the zoning ordinance (inaudible) .
Q.

To whom was this letter sent?

A.

It was to William and Joan Patton.

Q.

And why did you send a letter to William and

Joan Patton?
A.

!"n '!-ni^ «-ituat i oris

n<- o f f i c e wiJl

the people physically at the site.

contact

In this situation

I decided not to, since there is a notice posted on
the fence ro al] local and federal agents to not enter
the property.
Q.

And so is that the reason you didn't attempt

t: i) ma k: e p e r s on a 1 c on t a c t ?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

what did the letter contain?

What did you

13

March llth I actually did receive a letter from Joan
Patton.

Different issues were addressed in the

letter, but at no time did I receive the opinion they
were willing to comply with the city zoning ordinance.
THE COURT:

What was the date of the letter?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
MR. MCGINN:
to do these?

That was March 11, 1996.

Thank you.
Your Honor, how would you like

Do you want these marked individually,

or group them together as A-THE COURT:
cetera.

No, just mark them 1, 2, 3 et

How many do you have?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

I don't know.

I have--

Do you have dozens or have you

got a few?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

I've got approximately 10.
Okay, mark them that way.

MR. MCGINN:

Okay.

MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, I have shown these

photographs to counsel. May I approach the witness?
THE COURT:

You may.

Have you shown them co

Ms. Patton?
MR. MCGINN: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q.

BY MR. MCGINN:

Mr. Malloy, would you take a
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1

here today when you're testifying, would you please

2

just refer a 11 you.i comment s t ; : • t:he vi ::> 1 a t i o n t hat

3

exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot

4

will be saved for another day?

5

A.

I w:i 1 1 .

6

Q.

Thank you, would you please take the stand

7

again.

8

(Witness resumes stand)

9
10
11

Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as what
-~ described on the board, showing a residence and
a parking pad, correct?

12.

A.'

It is.

13

Q.

In that front yard area what types of

14

materials did you see on that day that you felt were a

15

violation of 14-34-080?

16
17

A.

I dc not recall speed fics, but there were

I numerous violations, on that lot.

In addition to the

18

trailer, that is the most obvious or most apparent

19

violation when you first 1 r>ok "it the lot.

20
21
22

Q.

Do you remember in general what types c:

materials were on that?
A.

There were lumber and other debris.

He had

23

things that I would see as just being trash that I

24

would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the

25

specifics.

i
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a citizen complaint?
A.

I had received and have received several

calls from concerned residents in regards to your
property.
Q.

And who would those residents be?

A.

I don't have that information in front of

Q.

But you do have it on file?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Was a charge levied against this property

me.

because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at
the time prior to the charge?
A.

I cannot really answer that.

When I started

with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to
investigate those, and one such case was your
property.

Because there had been previous work on it

I did browse through the existing file, but did not
use the material in there.

I went out to the site and

saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action
as of that date in contacting you and requesting that
the property be brought into compliance.
MS. PATTON:

I have no more questions for

the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like
to reserve the right to inquire the witness further.
THE COURT:

You may.

57

Mr

Humiston?
CROSS EXAMINATION

B 1 I II ! HUMTc,Tn' ' T I:
Q.

iO"

testimony,

Malloy, starting from your most recent

; understand that you say that you have

recei v ed c. -

jmplaints?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

You have personally received citizen

complaints from, neighbors ?
I have spoken with neighbors or people who
say

they are neighbors during the process of this

case,, that is correct...
Q

Did you initiate the contact with those

neighbors?
I did not.
C

Have those complaints come in before or

after we'1; re 1 ast met at th:i s ::(:)i i:r t (inaudible)
February

(inaudible)?

A.

I have received contact prior to that date

and s i i ice that da tie wi th quest ions regarding what wa s
going to happen, and that the yard is in -

needs some

attention.
Q.

Is :i t: nc ti t:i t le that you stated a ,/i: t:l lat: t::i i lie

in February that there had in fact been no citizen
complaints?
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether
or not the property was in violation on March 19,
1996.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:
Q.

May I approach?

You bet, you sure may.

BY MS. PATTON:

I would like to ask what the

condition of the properties in the neighborhood that
the defendant resides in, as you would have possibly
seen this morning?
A.

The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's not

a neighborhood I would like to live in.

There are

numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards
with piles of rocks and debris.

One house in

particular stands out as I went through the
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the
ceiling.

I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many

dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four
houses down from the Patton residence.
A house not too far away, a log house, the
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the area
are very similar.

It's an older neighborhood, the

houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept,
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of
the other parts of Provo.

That's how I'd describe the

94

neighborhood.
Q.

Is there a substantial difference between

the defendant s proper t> ai id 1 :1 i< = • i e s t : • if the
neighborhood?
A

*:ct that I noticed, not unless you go out

probably two blocks away to w] le i e a h i : ai id new
apartment - - a large apartment complex has been built,
there the yards are very nice, the lawn is cut,
watered regularly, looks quite nice, I: ait: once y oi i get
past that the houses, in my opinion, are not that
different.
'*?

PATTON:

Just one moment, your Honor

Your Honor, I've never done this before, so may I
app r o a ch

e11e r ?
THE COURT:

Let's have any photographs

you've got marked as exhibits.

You want to tell me

when they were taken?
MS. PATTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, tell me when they were

MS. PATTON:

Today, although the camera says

taken.

(inaudible).
THE COURT:
photos taken today?
MS. PATTON:

Can y on tell me the releva ncy of
Ji you've cleaned it all up~~
This isn't mine, this is--
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the City is working on those.

I just don't understand

the relevance.
MR. HUMISTON:

May I speak to that, your

Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. HUMISTON:

In Ms. Patton's cross

examination of Mr. Malloy, there was substantial
testimony that a lot of these determinations are
subjective.

We're dealing here basically with an

administrative agent, Mr. Malloy, who makes subjective
determinations.
Our position is that it's an arbitrary
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being
singled out for no apparent reason, and this gees to
the fact that this testimony would -- this evidence
would (inaudible) numerous violations.
As far as whether any of these specific ones
are being prosecuted, we would find that if Mr. Malloy
cares to testify to that, but we're not aware of any.
We are --we think it's significant that there are
numerous trailers on the street, numerous trailers
that have been parked there for a long time, and as
far as you can tell, the trailer seems to be the sole
issue at this point.
MR. MCGINN:

Objection to that.

We're not
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1

talking about any trailer on the street.

2

talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the

3

front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage,

4

trash, junk, those types of materials in the front

5

yard.

6

about trailers in the streets, whether people have

7

We're

That's what we're here about, we're not here

[ things parked-MR

HUMISTON:

Maybe we're arguing semantics

here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on
10

I the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers

11

*

-

-ont of hoi ises

We have evi dence

I
12

.

: :.,- . rind we are curious as to why the

13

Pattons are being singled out when .

14

| ^

15

| it's actually quite a bit cleaner.

16

.

-, relative to SOTHH

MR. MCGINN:

I l he

.ink evidence
',v..~: houses,

My contention is that there has

17

been i 10 showii ig o £ an i} e vldenee anywhere that: t:he

18

Pattons have been singled out.

In cross examination I

19

j thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other

20

violations in the area that they're working ''.'.n.

21

THE COURT:

I don't have any evidence of

22

discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City

23

Ordinances.

24

neighborhood and that the defendant's property

25

complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky,

The fact that we may have a junky
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too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants.
So we've got the testimony from this
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks
about the same as everybody else.

I don't think we

need anything else with respect to neighborhood
description.
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no
violation.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:

So are you sustaining the--

I'm sustaining the objection to

the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked
like.

That's what you wanted to do with them, that's

what she said.
MR. HUMISTON: Yes.
THE COURT:

Mrs. Patton, are you through

with this gentleman?
MS. PATTON:

I have no further questions for

the witness as this time, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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1

piece of it ended up at the dump.

2

high quality tools and equipment that was taken

3

directly out of the carport and there were witnesses

4

to the fact that it all ended up in the garages and

5

It was all very

J carports of the city workers who took it.

6

That's a fairly drastic punishment that's

7

already been imposed on prior occasions, and in licjhc

8

of that and, as I say, the Court's feeling that we've

9

been here before.

I feel that those things have been

10

paid for as far as penalties sought by the City.

11

one should be addressed under its own merits.

12

City has said straight up that they wanted compliance

13

and they have obtained compliance.

14

beyond that basically amounts to overkill.

15

I

THE COURT:

Thank you.

This

The

Anything further

Ms. Patton, and

16

gentlemen, when I wrote on this pad I have no

17

intention to babysit you folks, that's really what I

18

feel.

19

City running out to your home every 90 days and

20

sending a report back to this Court to see if you've

21

kept things like you should have.

22

I don't --by that, I'm not interested in the

You're adults, you ought to know by now

23

what's acceptable and what's not acceptable.

You

24

folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for you as your

25

witness, and Mr. Keller described the condition of

17

your property at the time in question, who was your
witness, as being ai 1 eyesore.

It was a terrible

neighborhood, he said, and yours -- and the condition
of your property was consistent with

he way things

look in general, UL was bad

-r ^c.^-r^ a

I

-— .

picture for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not
acceptable.
So my attitude is this.
guilty cf Count: I,
wh •><"'*"

*

You'v e been f :»iii id

you've cleaned up the property

"-"iceptabl e to the city and the zoning

requirement, and that's what I'm interested in.
I'm going to impose the following sentence.
*"• '

• a s p e c t !::, : Cc:>i :i r

'

cl ass B m: sdemeanor as to

Joan Patton, I'm going to impose a sentence of $500
and 3 0 days in Utah County Jail.
i " 'ill suspend all

f rfi.

r

i N -I I i ill o f

the time on the condition that the property remains in
an acceptable condition, no further violation of the
City for one y ear
With respect to the case of Provo City vs.
William Patton, I'm going to impose the same fine and
the same penalty witl i i espect to time

and wi 11 not --

will stay the execution of both the sentence and the
fine on the condition that the property remains in the
condition it is now for a oeriod of oi le year.
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12

a d v a n c e to ensure that t h i n g s are kept tidy, for want
of a b e t t e r word'1

J'v.- you want

talk to M r . M c G i n n about
M S . PATTON:
I wuuld

this?

I would

like to object

to take some time to

-- also for the

to en*? thing that was in --

that w e a s k e d for in the b i l l of p a r t i c u l a r s ,
w a s t h e fence

record

which

:'d like to put in a m o t i o n to d i s m i s s

or a s k the ......

ss

:

-^gueness

i

and

overbroad

-- for the fact that the o r d i n a n c e itself

vague and

overbroad.

is

|

Tn -~ o rdi nai i c e s a y s t ha t a f r on t: y a r d f e n c e
n e e d s co be three feet,
* *

it doesn't sny h i g h e r on it,

ay wide, it d o e s n ' t say

put up s e v e r a - three feet l e n s e s ,

• it said 1 can
i J ehaliemqe

fc.ini

the o r d i n a n c e for one thing, and I feel like that I

j

need to p.jt on record that

j

T H E COURT:
M S . PATTON:
it,

I do object to this f e n c e .

Ordinance.
T o this ordinance,

I object

to

right.
T H E COURT:

p l e a d in a b e y a n c e
MS
abeyance

Okay.

n

^ vmi u n d e r s t a n d

that

concept?

PATTON-

l u n d e r s t a n d the p l e a

in

concept.
T H E COURT:

Is that s o m e t h i n g

y o u w a n t to take a m i n u t e to talk?

-- o k a y .

Do

I

then.
COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

Let's see, today is —

COURT CLERK:

The hearing date will be April

22nd at 1:30.
THE COURT:

All right, that gives you

basically three months on that, and then-MR. MCGINN:

What time was the April 22nd?

COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

At 1:30.
In the event you can't get this

worked out, then you'd have a motion date for when you
file motions.
any, okay?

You need not come if you haven't filed

And then we'll set the matter for trial in

May -- May 19th?
COURT CLERK: Yes.
THE COURT:
cases, okay?

And that would be for both

I'll recognize his health problem today

in being unable to appear today, and we'll set both
cases together at the same time.
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:
(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
Thank you for your efforts.
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p r o g r e s s w e cai 1 m a k e .
A n d in t h e m e a n t i m e if u n f o r t u n a t e l y things
can't b e r e s o l v e d a n d w e come up w i t h s o m e t h i n g that's
mil t i 1a 1 1 y a c c ep t ab 1 e, t h e n w e w o n I d h a v e a t: i : :i a ] da t e
down t h e road that w e c o u l d a i m f o r .
I w o u l d request a trial d a t e a p p r o x i m a t e l y
t h r e e m o n t h s away
THE COURT:

I w o u l d suggest that to g i v e y o u

time.
I IR

MCGINI II! i \ in, I I Is

Pat ton m i g h t a s k f DI:

more time-vour Honor.

MS . PATT(»
THE COURT
MS.

- -i -

:
_ -*."\c

JL„

ti ii i ik: ) ou i leed?

I was asking for five months

PATTON:

rather than three.
MCGINN:

That seems ci 1 ittle long if we

can't - - the reason I say that is that I think we'll
i know wl tlilr

-:- m o n t h , two months» if v/e' re going to be

able to resolve this.
THE COURT:

All right , let's do this.

Let's

give 1rc\ i a motion hearing date about two and a half
months away, a trial setting a month thereafter.
COURT CLERK :
19 th It

The trial setting will be May

2, 3C
THE COURT:

I need a hearing date bef"ore

